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Terrorist and extremist movements have long exploited mass communications technology in pursuit of their 
political ends. The advent of the internet offers new opportunities. In response, state counter-measures seek to 
stem the impact of extreme ideologies by a number of tactics. “Positive” measures refer to those online initiatives 
that seek to make an impact through digital engagement and education and the provision of counter-narratives. 
“Negative” measures describe those approaches that advocate for, or result in, the deletion or restriction of 
violent extremist online content and/or the legal sanctioning of its online purveyors or users. More sanctions-
based outcomes arise through discretionary state activity such as warnings and counselling of vulnerable 
individuals, or through disruptive counter-measures such as bans on the giving of lectures or prohibitions on the 
entry into the country of speakers or the taking down of extremist internet sites. Other measures step over into 
criminal justice, as when individuals are prosecuted for collecting materials or information (including typically 
information downloaded from the internet) or for issuing messages which can be construed as direct or indirect 
incitements to terrorism. This paper will analyse the responses to extremist uses of the internet, with an emphasis 
upon legal responses – “online laws”.  
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Background  
Terrorism can be broadly defined as a combination of “violence and propaganda”, whereby “[v]iolence 
aims at behaviour modification by coercion [and] [p]ropaganda aims at the same through persuasion” 
(Schmid & De Graaf, 1982, p. 14). Therefore, its protagonists and the counter-terrorism laws must 
produce not only “violence” but also “armed propaganda” (Stohl, 1990, p. 93). This twin-track approach, 
which is also reflected in the legal definition contained in the Terrorism Act 2000, section 1, was 
famously illustrated by the pronouncement of the then director of publicity for Sinn Féin, Danny 
Morrison, in 1981, when he questioned: “Who here really believes we can win the war through the 
ballot box? But will anyone here object if, with a ballot paper in this hand and an Armalite in the other, 
we take power in Ireland?” (McAllister, 2004, p. 124). Even 30 years ago, Morrison felt that he was 
engaged in a perilous exercise – akin to “walking on eggshells” (R v Martin and others, 1992, p. 14) - and, 
while Director of Publicity for Sinn Féin, he paid the price with a conviction (later overturned) and 
several years of imprisonment for his proximity to the IRA’s “punishment” machinery (R v Morrison, 
2009).  
Terrorist and extremist political movements have long exploited the “performativity” (de Graaf, 2011) of 
every available mass communications technology. Morrison’s forefathers in the Irish Republican press in 
the nineteenth century were repeatedly charged with offences against the state (Martin v R, 1848; R v 
Charles Gavan Duffy, 1848; R v Grey, 1865; R v John Mitchel, 1848; R v Sullivan and Pigott, 1868). 
Contemporary attention has turned to electronic news media, including terrestrial and satellite 
2 
 
television, such as Hizbollah’s establishment of its Al Manar television station in the early 1990s (Saul & 
Joyce, 2010), through to internet media, as latterly represented by the “slickly” produced contemporary 
digital content of the Islamic State (IS) (Ingram, 2014; Klausen, 2015).  
In response, the state’s counter-measures seek to stem the impact of extreme ideologies by a number 
of tactics. Some measures positively engage and provide counternarratives, responses which are 
especially attractive since they endorse and promote the value of free speech. This stance is an aspect of 
the “Prevent” strand of the UK’s counterterrorism strategy by which action is taken to stop people 
becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism, including by “Engaging in the battle of ideas – 
challenging the ideologies that extremists believe can justify the use of violence, primarily by helping 
Muslims who wish to dispute these ideas to do so” (Home Office, 2006, p. 2). In this way, there is an 
emphasis on anticipatory risk by attacking upstream the ideologies and behaviours which might foster 
violence, counselling the vulnerable, and engaging with relevant sectors such as higher education which 
can be sites for “radicalization”. Problematic aspects of “Prevent” include uncertain boundaries with 
community integration, weak causal links between radicalization and terrorism, the perception of spying 
on minority communities, and vague performance indicators (Bartlett & Miller, 2011; Bouhana & 
Wilkstro¨m, 2011; Home Office, 2011; Huq, 2013; Lakhani, 2012; Lord Carlile, 2011; Munton, 2011; 
Thomas, 2012).  
Some aspects of “Prevent” have a sharper focus and more sanctions-based outcomes, and so the battle 
of ideas may lead into another aspect of CONTEST, namely “Pursue”, by which measures are taken to 
deal with terrorist threats. Some of these measures remain within “Prevent”, and trigger discretionary 
state activity such as warnings and counselling of vulnerable individuals; some arise through disruptive 
counter-measures which can be backed by law such as bans on the giving of lectures or prohibitions on 
the entry into the country of speakers or the taking down of extremist internet sites. Others step over 
into “Pursue”, as when individuals are prosecuted for collecting materials or information (including 
typically information downloaded from the internet) or for issuing messages which can be construed as 
direct or indirect incitements to terrorism. In this way, repressive action is taken to starve terrorists of 
what Prime Minister Thatcher called in 1985 the “oxygen of publicity” 
(http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/display document.asp?docid¼106096).  
The state use of counter-measures to shape or close down communications is of venerable lineage and 
governments have long responded with robust legal restraints. Amongst the most prominent 
restrictions were those introduced in the Republic of Ireland (1976 – 1994) and the UK (1988 – 1994) 
arising from the Northern Ireland conflict and banning the broadcasts of Loyalist and Republican 
paramilitaries (Banwell, 1995; Horgan, 2002; Kingston, 1995).  
The advent of the internet means new communications opportunities and facilities for terrorists, just as 
it has proven a boon for everyone else with access to the technology. For terrorists, there are three 
potential advantages, all with profound legal implications. The first and most alluring new opportunity is 
that the internet becomes itself a new societal vulnerability which the terrorists may target. However, 
while there have been some attacks through hacking and denial of service, the more lurid catastrophes, 
such as aircraft falling from the sky through sabotaged air traffic control systems, that have often been 
elaborated upon in the media, have not materialized (Conway, 2014; Gordon & Ford, 2002; Sundaram & 
Jaishankar, 2008; Weimann, 2005), though governments have become highly conscious of the need for 
cybersecurity and have issued policies accordingly (Cabinet Office, 2009, 2011; Department of 
Homeland Security, 2003, 2013; Home Office, 2009a; Legrand, 2014).  
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At the opposite end of the spectrum, the internet is secondly an increasingly invaluable “back-office” 
tool of terrorism. In this sense, a variety of other functions can be served by terrorist use of the internet, 
including information-gathering on potential targets, planning, logistics (including the gathering of 
financing and the movement of resources), recruitment, and, most basic but most vital of all, intra-
group communications (UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012; Walker, 2006).  
The third aspect of usage concerns the use of the internet as a mass media outlet for publicizing and 
explaining activities and for engagement with supporters and potential supporters. This aspect of 
internet activity affords particular advantages to terrorists because it is harder to control and close 
down than traditional media outlets, being cross-jurisdictional in operation and adaptable to 
enforcement constraints. Furthermore, internet access means that terrorists are no longer wholly reliant 
on the mass media to act as carriers and even intermediaries, because it affords otherwise unattainable 
prominence and meaning to their violence, giving rise to the possibility of “apology” for terrorism 
(Carruthers, 2000, p. 170; Walker, 2011, chap. 8). The internet now presents actors, whether mass 
movements or lone actors, with increased opportunities to propagate globally their own interpretations 
and messages (Weimann, 2014). Thus, even as early as 1998, approximately half of the (then) 30 groups 
designated as foreign terrorist organizations under the US Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996 operated websites, including the Lebanese Hizbollah (Conway, 2005a), the Sri Lankan Tamil 
Tigers (Tekwani, 2003), and others (Conway, 2005b). These early websites fulfilled a largely 
unidirectional “broadcast” function. Their content was tightly controlled by the terrorist organizations, 
and opportunities for interaction were negligible. By the next decade, online interactive forums had 
become popular (Damphouse, 2008; Zelin, 2013); many forums remain active today, but nationalist and 
other long-established extremists (Frennett & Smith, 2012; German Federal Office for the Protection of 
the Constitution, 2013) and now jihadis (Brachman, 2009, p. 19; Zelin, 2013) increasingly have greater 
recourse to mainstream social media platforms. Moving to the present era, IS and its online supporters 
have proven themselves to be perhaps the most adept and prolific producers and disseminators of 
digital content. IS does not have a single official website; instead “official” IS online content emanates 
from several IS-affiliated content production entities or so-called “media departments” (such as al-
Furqan Media, al-Hayat Media Center) and is distributed via jihadi forums, but increasingly also via the 
major social media platforms and other content-hosting sites. In July 2014, the group released the first 
issue of its Dabiq magazine, similar in style to Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula’s Inspire (Lemieux, 
2014). However, the relationship between consumption of extremist online content, such as that 
produced by IS, and the adoption of extremist ideology or of recruitment to terrorism remains unproven 
(Benson, 2014; House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2012, para. 38; Rieger, Frischlich, & Bente, 
2013; von Behr et al., 2013). Nevertheless, the growth of online content from terrorist groups and its 
potential attractiveness to, and resonance with, discontented “digital natives” (young people who have 
grown up with the internet) has become a source of official apprehension throughout Europe (EU 
CounterTerrorism Coordinator, 2014, pp. 2– 3). A particular alleged danger that has received utmost 
attention is the role of online jihadi content influencing young people to travel to Syria as “foreign 
fighters” and “jihadi brides” (Fisher & Prucha, 2014), which gives rise to trepidation about their role in 
the conflict zone and even more so regarding their capacity for future terrorism upon their return home. 
As a result, there has been a call to take action against violent extremism on the internet by the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2178 of 24 September 2014. “Addressing the growing issue 
of foreign terrorist fighters” in Iraq and Syria, Article 17,  
urges Member States, in this context, to act cooperatively when taking national measures to prevent terrorists 
from exploiting technology, communications and resources, including audio and video, to incite support for 
terrorist acts, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms and in compliance with other obligations 
under international law.  
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The remainder of this paper will describe and analyse the responses to the foregoing extremist uses of 
the internet, with emphasis upon legal responses – “online laws”. Much of the following is therefore 
concerned with what is called “content control”: efforts on the part of regulators to regulate what sort 
of material is made available on the internet, including the removal of “objectionable” materials 
currently accessible and the erection of barriers to the uploading of such materials. As already indicated, 
the latter so-called “negative” measures may be contrasted with more “positive” approaches. 
“Negative” measures describe all those approaches that advocate for, or result in, the deletion or 
restriction of violent extremist online content and/or the legal sanctioning of its online purveyors or 
users; “positive” measures refer to those online initiatives that seek to make an impact through digital 
engagement and education.  
 
Content control issues in general  
Online laws may be a tempting option for regulators, but they must operate within normative 
boundaries, which require consideration of efficacy (even if achieved only in symbolic terms) and regard 
to constitutionalism which points towards values such as the rule of law and human rights. On the latter 
point, both Article 19 of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) 1948 and Article 10 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR) identify freedom of expression and the right to 
seek, receive, and impart information (including from foreign countries, as confirmed by the European 
Court of Human Rights in Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v Sweden and Ta´rsasa´g a 
Szabadsa´gjogoke´rt v Hungary) as fundamental human rights. The conferment of rights nonetheless 
recognizes that freedom of expression can be counterbalanced by limitations for the sake of, inter alia, 
“public order” (UNDHR, Article 29) or “national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime” (ECHR, Article 10(2)). This dichotomous international regime, in 
conjunction with states’ widely differing social, political, and religious contexts, added to the absence of 
any comprehensive international law definition of terrorism, opens a wide discretion for variant 
interpretations and levels of tolerance (for surveys, see Akdeniz, 2010; Golumbic, 2008; Sieber & Brunst, 
2007).  
Uncertainties as to the boundaries of online laws can also arise through differences between the “real” 
and “cyber” worlds. Existing rules about speech, promulgated for application to meetings, marches, and 
printed materials in the real world, can be applied to the internet, as adopted in the EU for racist speech 
(European Commission, 2001). However, it is arguable that the internet requires specific legislation 
tailored to its specific characteristics which impart differences in terms of risk and legal attributes. The 
risk factors include quantity (potential audience size and accessibility without the intercession of editors 
or otherwise) as well as quality (the intensity and instantaneity of messages and the facility for personal 
interaction). The special legal attributes include the complexities of trans-jurisdictional impact, the 
potential for anonymity, and the technical expertise and specialist equipment required to gather 
evidence against wrongdoers (Spiecker genannt Döhmann, 2013). These risk factors and legal attributes 
become especially troubling when the effects of online extremism may prove so pernicious.  
It follows that many countries have enacted online laws, many of them prompted by terrorism 
developments, such as 9/11 and 7/7. The online laws secure some tangible benefits in terms of resolving 
the boundaries of forbidden conduct in accordance with the requirement of the rule of law. However, 
criticisms also arise about the creation of a disproportionately blanket “surveillance society” (Fuchs et 
al., 2011; House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2008; House of Lords Select Committee on the 
Constitution, 2009; Lyon, 2005; Scheinin, 2009) affecting the human rights of all and not just suspects 
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(Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, 2014; Walker & Akdeniz, 2003), the dubious efficacy of many 
provisions, and the absence of more innovative responses. Even the security authorities appear 
dissatisfied with the regime, and so, as revealed by Edward Snowden, they allegedly practice 
“dataveillance” on a vast scale in ways which may transgress the often generous boundaries of existing 
online law (Liberty v GCHQ, 2014, 2015).  
 
“Negative” online measures  
States seek to abate the use of the internet for violent radicalization and other violent extremist 
purposes by limiting user and audience access, either by ex ante or post hoc censorship of content (such 
as by criminal law or take-down measures) or by controls over internet infrastructure (such as by filters 
and firewalls), or by combination of the two. As for controls over internet infrastructure, states, 
especially powerful states with large defence budgets and advanced technological capabilities, can seek 
to constrain the effectiveness of terrorist cyber-based strategies by limiting user and audience access to 
online platforms through control of the internet infrastructure. A common element for governmental 
filtering is generally an index of websites that are blocked. Such filtering of content is carried in 
countries such as China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Singapore, though more often related to the 
suppression of political dissent or unacceptable cultural intrusions than because of terrorism. However, 
an exceptional instance of terrorism filtering arose in December 2014, when the government of India 
instituted a block on 32 major websites on the basis of their hosting what Arvind Gupta, head of 
Information Technology for India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, called “Anti India content from ISIS”. 
Five sites (weebly.com, vimeo.com, Pastebin, dailymotion.com, and gist.github. com) were unblocked 
after agreeing to remove “Anti-India” content (Panigrahi, 2015).  
A survey will now be undertaken which will concentrate upon online laws in the US, UK, and Europe. As 
well as “negative” online national and international laws, some counter-measures involve quasi-legal or 
“soft law” voluntary codes or regulatory dialogue with communication service providers (CSPs).  
US online laws  
Any effort to impose negative controls over internet-based speech will be especially contentious in the 
US context because the First Amendment to the US Constitution prioritizes freedom of expression, 
including the right to publish extreme and offensive materials on the internet (Walker & Weaver, 2013). 
As a result, many extremist and terrorist websites have been hosted in the US. For example, in 1997, 
controversy erupted when it was revealed that the State University of New York (SUNY) at Binghamton 
was hosting the website of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and that a Tupac Amaru 
(MRTA) solidarity site was operating out of the University of California at San Diego (UCSD) (Conway, 
2007a). SUNY officials promptly shut down the FARC site. In San Diego, officials decided in favour of free 
speech, and the Tupac Amaru site remained operative for some years. It was not illegal at that time to 
host such a site, even if a group was designated a foreign terrorist organization by the US Department of 
State, as long as a site was not seeking financial contributions or providing financial support. This 
toleration persists even after 9/11. For instance, though listed in 2011 by the UN 1267 Committee and 
by the US as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) under US Executive Order 13224, and 
proscribed in the UK under the Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organizations) (Amendment) (No. 2) 
Order 2013, SI 2013/3172, Imarat Kavkaz (Caucasus Emirate) remains available on the internet through 
the sympathetic Kavkaz Centre (http://www.kavkazcenter.com) which is hosted by Cloudflare in the US.  
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The principal qualification to free speech made by online laws since 9/11 has been the aggressive usage 
of the anti-terrorist offences of material support (Chesney, 2005, 2007; Cole, 2008; Ward, 2008). First, 
18 United States Code (USC) section 2339A, enacted originally by the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act 1994, Public Law 103- 322 section 120005, addresses the provision directly or 
indirectly of financial or other material support or resources knowing or intending their use for terrorist 
activities in contravention of 36 listed offences. Proof of intent is required that the recipient is a terrorist 
group (even recklessness is not sufficient and certainly not negligence: US v Lakhani, 2007). By 18 USC 
section 2339B, enacted originally by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 1996, Public Law 
104-132, section 303, it is an offence without any requirement of intent or belief as to the terrorist 
nature of the acts to be aided to provide material support or resources (including to oneself) to a 
designated foreign terrorist organization under 8 USC s 1189(a)(1), a concept which was inserted by the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 1996, section 302 and elaborated by the Code of Federal 
Regulation volume 31, sections 597.101-901. Al-Qaida was listed in 1999. The Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act 2004, Public Law 108-458, section 6603(c)(2), clarified that knowledge (but still 
not recklessness or negligence) is confined to the fact that the group is designated or has engaged in 
terrorism. Title III of the USA Patriot Act, sections 803 to 815, also known as the International Money 
Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act 2001 (Public Law 107-56), augmented sections 
2339A and 2339B. It widened the notion of “material support or resources” by including, for example, 
expert advice or assistance and increased the penalties to up to 15 years and up to life if the death of 
any person results.  
Though just a handful of truly speech-related prosecutions have arisen, free speech activists fail to be 
convinced that the normal constitutional test of clear and present danger of imminent harmful action, 
the classic test used in Brandenburg v Ohio (1969), is met. In 32 County Sovereignty Committee v 
Department of State (2002), a number of Irish dissident republican groups linked to the Real IRA sought 
to contest their designation as foreign terrorist organizations. The US Court of Appeals concluded that 
the groups demonstrated neither a property interest nor a presence in the jurisdiction, and so the 
Secretary therefore did not have to provide 32 County or the Association with any particular process 
before designating them as foreign terrorist organizations, and that the decision had been taken on the 
basis of enough information. In US v Iqbal and Elahwal, Iqbal pleaded guilty to providing material 
support to Hizbollah (a designated foreign terrorist organization) by operating a satellite television 
service known as HDTV Limited, which carried the Al Manar television channel and for which Iqbal was 
directly paid thousands of dollars by Al Manar. Next, in 2012, Tarek Mehanna was sentenced to more 
than 17 years’ imprisonment for conspiracy to provide material support to Al-Qaida, providing material 
support to terrorists (and conspiracy to do so), conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country, 
conspiracy to make false statements to the FBI, and two counts of making false statements. His internet-
related material support arose from, among other things, translating and posting on the internet Al-
Qaida recruitment videos and other documents, including some that encouraged violence against 
American military forces. A number of criticisms were voiced about this curtailment of free speech 
(Abel, 2013; Brown, 2012; Knox, 2014).  
The constitutionality of the material support offences was upheld by the US Supreme Court in 2010 
against challenges based on free speech and vagueness in Holder v Humanitarian Law Project (2010), a 
decision which provoked further criticism (Cole, 2012; Marguiles, 2011– 2012; Tomkins, 2011). The 
Humanitarian Law Project planned to train the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam in peaceful modes of conflict resolution. The Supreme Court confirmed that Congress had 
intended to prohibit aid to such groups, even if for the purpose of facilitating peace negotiations or 
United Nations processes, because such assistance fell within the definitions used by the section and 
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because, as a matter of policy, any assistance could help to legitimate the terrorist organization and 
allow it to allocate its own resources for purely violent activities. Seeking to justify the decision, Chief 
Justice John G. Roberts Jr argued that “under the material support statute, plaintiffs may say anything 
they wish on any topic” and pointed out that “Congress has not sought to suppress ideas or opinions in 
the form of ‘pure political speech’” (pp. 20–21). Despite these statements, individuals can be convicted 
of terrorism offences on the basis of online speech acts with very tenuous links to notions of financing or 
support by deed. As an editorial in The Washington Post (2010) put it:  
Which of the following is illegal under the law that bars providing “material support” to terrorists?:  
1. Giving money to a terrorist organization.  
2. Providing explosives training to terrorists.  
3. Urging a terrorist group to put down its arms in favor of using lawful, peaceful means to achieve political goals.  
After Monday’s Supreme Court ruling in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project the answer is: all three.  
A commitment to First Amendment rights is equally the reason proffered by major US social media 
companies, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, for their decisions to decline to censor some of the 
violent extremist content posted to their sites. In 2011, US lawmakers exhorted Twitter and YouTube to 
cancel accounts linked to al-Shabab (Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, 2011). In 
response, Twitter has adopted the mantra of being “the free speech wing of the free speech party” 
(Barnett, 2011) and has in the past refused requests from government officials, activist organizations, 
and concerned individuals to cancel the accounts of other extremist groups. However, its policy began 
to shift in 2012 towards a more country-specific approach (Taylor, 2012, p. 10), and in January 2013, 
Twitter cancelled the account of al-Shabab following the group tweeting photographs of the body of a 
French commando whom they had killed followed by explicit threats to execute Kenyan hostages 
(Howden, 2013). In the event, al-Shabab quickly re-established their Twitter account, under a slightly 
different name, and Twitter was once again embroiled in controversy when the group live Tweeted their 
attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya in September 2013 (Alexander, 2013). Twitter 
appears to have shifted its position since then, engaging in a wholesale cull of violent jihadi accounts 
from mid-2014 possibly, according to one analyst, at the behest of the US government and almost 
certainly also influenced by the use of these accounts to spread images from and links to beheading 
videos (Friedman, 2014).  
These verdicts by CSPs of life and death over social media accounts highlight the lack of transparency 
surrounding how decisions are taken as to which accounts are cancelled and why. Twitter has no 
detailed and publicly available guidelines on the matter but merely reports on requests (which are 
posted at http://www.chillingeffects.org), as does Google 
(http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/). The Edward Snowden 
revelations also alleged on-going interchanges with state agencies which have become so embarrassing 
for CSPs that they have proposed greater use of encryption (Yadron, 2014).  
UK online laws  
Compared to the US, the UK anti-terrorism online laws contain a more comprehensive catalogue of 
criminal offence and take-down measures, with less restraint in their application, though the results 
often remain controversial (Carlile & Macdonald, 2014; Conway, 2006; Cram, 2009; Walker, 2014, chaps 
2, 6). These incursions into online activities are unashamedly more restrictive, in line with the more 
qualified expressive rights under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as 
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implemented by the Human Rights Act 1998, compared to the more forthright statements in the US 
Constitution.  
Reflecting the “Pursue” element of CONTEST, the UK legislature has developed the use of “precursor 
crimes” in order to allow for early intervention against terrorist threats without having to await the 
conclusion of an outrage. The mainstay precursor offences dealing with extremist materials on the 
internet are sections 57 and 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Section 57(1) is contravened by possession of 
an article in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the possession is for a purpose 
connected with terrorism. The articles possessed will often be lawful in themselves and even 
commonplace – such as rubber gloves, batteries, and wires. Regarding multiple-use articles such as 
computer disks or cars, section 57(1) only requires “a” purpose to be nefarious, not a main or sole 
purpose. In R v Omar Altimini (2008), computer materials held by a “sleeper” contravened section 57. 
Recognizing possible overreach, section 57(2) offers a defence by proof on an evidentiary basis 
according to R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene (2000) that possession of the article 
was not for a purpose connected with terrorism. Section 57 is highly valued by police and prosecutors. 
Since 2006, sentences have increased and include an award of 12 years (“the top of the spectrum”) for a 
vast collection of propaganda and instructional guides, observations of security at Manchester Airport, 
and musings about attacks (R v Sultan Muhammed and Aabid Hassain Khan, 2009).  
Even more relevant are the offences under section 58. Section 58(1) contains two variants of actus reus: 
collecting or making a record of information likely to be useful to terrorism or possessing a document or 
record containing information of that kind. A “record” includes electronic formats: section 58(2). The 
defendant must be aware of the nature of the contents, according to R v G and J, 2009, paras. 47, 48). 
However, the Crown is also not required to show that the defendant harboured a terrorist purpose. In 
RvK, the defendant, Khalid Khaliq, argued boldly that section 58 was insufficiently certain to comply with 
Article 7 of the European Convention. In response, the Court of Appeal sought to remedy any 
imprecision by reading in the requirement of a purpose useful to terrorism. Thus, the purpose of the 
information (rather than the possessor) is at stake – it intrinsically “calls for an explanation”, which goes 
further than previous interpretations (see Hodgson & Tadros, 2009; R v G and J, 2009, paras 43, 44). The 
information must be of an intrinsic kind which gives rise to a reasonable suspicion that it is likely to 
provide practical assistance to a person committing or preparing terrorism rather than simply 
encouraging the commission of terrorism. To illustrate, the A –Z of London could be useful to a terrorist 
in the location of a target, but that use would not fall within section 58 since that document does not 
intrinsically arouse suspicion. In R v Terence Roy Brown (2011, paras 17, 34), an internet seller of 
literature, such as The Anarchist Cookbook, which he admitted was useful to terrorists, was convicted 
even though he depicted his activities as a non-ideological business on which he paid taxes. By section 
58(3), it is a defence to prove a “reasonable excuse”. Section 58 is commonly invoked against those who 
download and disseminate extremist internet material. In R v Khuram Shazad Iqbal (2014), the 
defendant (aka “Abu Irhaab”) had used Facebook and Twitter to post links to 848 examples of extreme 
content (videos and articles) on the internet and was found with nine copies of the Al-Qaida magazine 
Inspire on his laptop.  
There have been 76 charges under section 57 and 44 under section 58 from 11 September 2001 to 31 
March 2013 (out of 375 under anti-terrorism legislation) (Home Office, 2013, Tables A05a and b). The 
main controversies surrounding these offences concern the equivocal nature of the actions involved and 
the switched burden of proof of reasonable excuse. Journalists and even scholars (as in the case of 
Nottingham University student Rizwaan Sabir, 2011) can in theory fall foul, as can self-proclaimed 
freedom- fighters, such as another student in R v Gul, 2013, para. 54). Despite the shifts in judicial 
interpretation which have occurred, the European Court of Human Rights in Jobe v United Kingdom 
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(2011, para. 31) rejected a complaint that section 58(3) had resulted in the application of a retrospective 
criminal penalty. The Court was of the view that the complaint about the interference with free 
expression was also “manifestly ill-founded”:  
It was clearly justified by the legitimate aims of the interests of national security and the prevention and disorder 
of crime. It was also necessary in a democratic society, particularly when s. 58 did not criminalise in a blanket 
manner the collection or possession of material likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of 
terrorism; it only criminalised collection or possession of that material without a reasonable excuse. In the Court’s 
view, this is an entirely fair balance to strike. (para. 35) 
 Countering the ideology of terrorism, often in the guise of online terrorism, is further addressed by 
offences against extremist speech and publications in sections 1 and 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006. These 
offences react not only to the July 2005 London bombings but also in some respects to the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1624 of 14 September 2005 and the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention 
of Terrorism 2005, both of which are described later.  
The principal offence in section 1(1) relates to the publication of statements that are “likely to be 
understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect 
encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of 
terrorism” or specified offences which are referred to as “Convention offences”. As for the mens rea, in 
section 1(2)(b), the publisher must either intend members of the public to be directly or indirectly 
encouraged or otherwise induced by the statement to commit, prepare, or instigate acts of terrorism or 
specified offences, or be subjectively reckless as to whether members of the public will be so directly or 
indirectly encouraged by the statement. The most controversial facet of the offence is “indirect” 
encouragement. By sub-section (3), the indirect encouragement of terrorism includes a statement that 
“glorifies” the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism or specified offences (either in their actual 
commission or in principle) but only if members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer that 
what is being glorified in the statement is being glorified as conduct that should be “emulated by them 
in existing circumstances”. “Glorify” is partly defined in section 20(2) as including “praise or 
celebration”. Having targeted the originators of statements in section 1, section 2(1) deals with 
secondary dissemination. The offence may be committed by a “terrorist publication” by electronic 
transmission, for example. It is a defence under section 2(9) to show that the statement neither 
expressed the publisher’s views nor had his endorsement. This defence can benefit “all legitimate 
librarians, academics and booksellers” (Baroness Scotland, 2005a) (and broadcasters and bloggers) who 
may have examined the article but do not endorse its contents. There were only 10 prosecutions up to 
31 March 2013 (Home Office, 2013). As with section 58, challenges on human rights grounds were given 
short shrift by the Court of Appeal in Iqbal v R (2014, para. 41):  
The right to freedom of expression protected by Article 10 is of course not an absolute right, but is a qualified right. 
Article 10(2) provides in its material parts, that this freedom is subject to such restrictions and penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime and for the protection of the rights of others. All those interests are engaged 
by acts of terrorism which violate the fundamental rights of others... it is proportionate and legitimate to interfere 
with the right to freedom of expression in order to reduce, diminish or extinguish such acts.  
A more pre-emptive approach than prosecution is set out in section 3, which seeks to apply these 
offences in the context of unlawfully terrorist-related articles or records on the internet and to devise a 
short-circuit enforcement power. In justifying this measure, it was claimed that “extremist” websites 
have proliferated (Home Office, 2009b, para. 5.14), and that communication technologies represent 
both an important terrorist target and logistical aid. Section 3(1) applies where the publication under 
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section 1 or the dissemination under section 2 was produced electronically. The impugned materials are 
those which are “unlawfully terrorism-related” under section 3(7). The short-circuit process under 
section 3 (3) arises where a constable forms the opinion that material held on the system of the service 
provider is “unlawfully terrorism-related”. A notice can be issued which requires the provider to arrange 
for the material to become unavailable to the public and also warns the provider that failure to comply 
with the notice within two working days under section 3 (2) and (9) will result in the matter being 
regarded as being endorsed with consequent potential liability under sub-section (4). Critics argued that 
these restrictions on freedom of expression should engage a judicial officer at some stage so that the 
value of rights could be considered more explicitly than in the likely calculations of a commercial service 
provider. The government retort was that judicial process would cause undue delay in a “fast moving 
world” (Baroness Scotland, 2005b), though the Home Office Guidance on Notices Issued under Section 3 
of the Terrorism Act 2006 does seek to confine the initiation of notices to expert officers of the 
Metropolitan Police Service Counter-Terrorist Command.  
By 15 January 2015, the removal of 72,000 web items (at an increasing rate per year) had been 
prompted (James Brokenshire, 2015), though how this figure relates to alerts is not revealed (House of 
Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2012, para. 53). The potential operation of section 3 is curtailed by 
the impact of the Electronic Cabinet Office, 2009s/31/EC, as implemented by the Electronic Commerce 
(European Communities Directive) Regulations 2002, SI 2002/2013. More importantly, section 3 is 
bypassed by responsive action by CSPs in response to informal police requests. Indeed, the Guidance 
suggests dialogue and that a “voluntary approach” should be taken where the provider is not viewed as 
encouraging publication (paras 20, 27, Annex C). In consequence, section 3 has never been formally 
invoked. The public are also invited to sound an alert about extremism and terrorism via a government 
website which feeds into the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU), launched by the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in 2010 (Blain, 2011; https://www.gov.uk/report-terrorism), 
to encourage “a civic challenge against material that [the public] find offensive, even if it is not illegal”.  
The shortcomings of these warning systems were highlighted by the head of Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the UK Prime Minister in November 2014. The head of 
GCHQ, Robert Hannigan, stated that social media companies are “the command-and-control networks 
of choice for terrorists”, with some technology companies “in denial” about the internet’s misuse 
(Hannigan, 2014). Following added criticism by the Prime Minister (Wintour, 2014), several UK operators 
(BT, Virgin, Sky, and TalkTalk) agreed to install public reporting buttons to flag terrorist material on their 
services whilst Facebook, Google, Yahoo, and Twitter agreed to mentor smaller internet companies on 
standards of content monitoring.  
It is more difficult to contend with overseas CSPs. No international system replicates these UK take-
down measures elsewhere, despite the dangers recognized by the EU Framework Directive on 
Combating Terrorism, 2008/919/JHA, paragraph 4. As previously explained, most extremist content is 
hosted by US-based CSPs. Their receptivity to self-censorship is lower than for European-based 
companies, as highlighted by the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC, 2014) Report on the 
intelligence relating to the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby. One of the soldier’s killers, Michael Adebowale, 
had several of his multiple social media internet accounts (later revealed by the media to be operated 
through Facebook) closed proactively without official request by the CSP using an automated process 
because, according to GCHQ, “they hit triggers ... related to their criteria for closing things down on the 
basis of terrorist content” (para. 384). Facebook also learned, on completion of a retrospective review of 
all his 11 accounts (para. 390), that Adebowale had also discussed “in the most explicit and emotive 
manner” over Facebook’s instant messaging service his desire to murder a soldier (para. 384). The ISC 
was critical of monitoring procedures by CSPs (para. 389), though serial investigations by the Security 
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Service were excused as sufficiently thorough, especially because, as pointed out even by GCHQ (para. 
393), true intent can be very difficult to discern from online communications. Putting aside other 
relevant issues around data privacy, accountability for surveillance, the duty of care to users, and the 
economic efficiency, were social media companies to be obliged to proactively monitor and share all 
postings of a violent extremist nature with security authorities, the former would have little time or 
money for anything else and the latter would be deluged with information and most likely rendered 
unable to function on an economic basis.  
European online laws  
The UN has achieved almost no impact in the field of online laws against violent online extremism, a 
position in part attributable to US and other Western reluctance to invite and sanctify restrictions by 
undemocratic states on freedom of expression on the web. However, the UN has occasionally called for 
specific action against online terrorism, such as via the UNSCR 2178 which has already been described. A 
similar call to action was issued through UNSCR 1624 of 14 September 2005, “Prohibition of incitement 
to commit terrorist acts”, calling upon states in Article 1(a) to “[p]rohibit by law incitement to commit a 
terrorist act or acts”. In the background, UNSCR 1535 of 26 March 2004 creates the Counter Terrorism 
Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), which can provide technical assistance to states. Another 
technical body, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime has produced a useful guidance (2012) in 
collaboration with the United Nations CounterTerrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) which has 
also produced its own guides and analysis (2009 and 2011).  
Within Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has additionally 
performed similar advisory and exhortatory roles. Its Sofia Ministerial Council decided in 2004 that  
participating States will exchange information on the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes and identify 
possible strategies to combat this threat, while ensuring respect for international human rights obligations and 
standards, including those concerning the rights to privacy and freedom of opinion and expression. (OSCE, 2004)  
A follow-up decision from the OSCE’s Brussels Ministerial Council in 2006 invited participating states to 
“increase their monitoring of websites of terrorist/violent extremist organizations and their supporters 
and to invigorate their exchange of information” (OSCE, 2006). Since that time, numerous OSCE events 
have aired various policy views addressing internet controls, some of the latest being published in 2013 
(OSCE, 2013), though no legal rules have been instituted as a result of this platform for discussion.  
The legal innovations within Europe have emerged from the Council of Europe and the European Union. 
As for the Council of Europe, which has engaged in the issuance of guidance too (2008), the Convention 
on the Prevention of Terrorism 2005 (European Treaty Series 196) was mentioned earlier, and Article 5 
called for action against “public provocation to commit a terrorist offence”, much of which took place 
online (see Barendt, 2009; Parker, 2007; Walker, 2011, chap. 8). Of still wider application is the 
(Budapest) Convention on Cybercrime 2001 and the Additional Protocol 2002 (European Treaty Series 
185, 189). These international law measures take action on a broad front, but without any specific 
reference to terrorism. For example, the Protocol specifies various types of hate speech that should be 
prohibited on the internet, including racist and xenophobic materials, justification of genocide, and 
crimes against humanity. The documents are also wide in the sense that they can be ratified by non-
European states that participated in its elaboration; included in this category is the US, which has 
ratified the former but not the latter on First Amendment grounds, a stance shared by the UK. The 
limited nature of these instruments has only been discussed once by the Cybercrime Convention 
Committee (T-CY), at its third Plenary in 2008, where it was concluded that it would be better to 
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concentrate on fuller state implementation of the 2001 and 2005 conventions before venturing with any 
further law-making.  
As regards the EU, terrorist uses of the internet and the risks posed by them have not been the subject 
of serious attention by its policymakers until quite recently because it is viewed as a relatively new issue 
and because the gestation of EU policy occurs at a glacial pace (Argomaniz, 2014, p. 5). Amongst the 
measures which have emerged, the most concrete in legal terms is Council Framework Decision 
2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008, amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating 
terrorism, which requires state action to criminalize incitement of terrorism via the internet, including 
“public provocation to commit a terrorist offence”, as well as the use of the internet for recruitment for 
terrorism and training for terrorism. Though the UK had passed such legislation in 2006, in response to 
overlapping UN demands, some other EU member state countries were thus prompted to take action 
(Galli & Weyembergh, 2012). Other initiatives undertaken by the EU include “Check the Web”, which 
was launched in 2007 and allows states to pool data on terrorist propaganda and internet chatter at the 
European Police Office (Europol) (Article 36 Committee, 2007). The EU Commission also funded a 
project titled CleanIT (http://cleanitproject.eu/) to initiate “a structured public–private dialogue 
between government representatives, academics, Internet industry, Internet users and non-
governmental organisations in the European Union” on “Reducing terrorist use of the Internet”. Its final 
product was a report on conditions for action, plus best practices (2013). It has been argued that the 
real value of the CleanIT project resided in the fact that “it has turned the spotlight on a wider problem: 
the [European] Commission’s reliance on industry solutions to address problems that are badly defined 
by policymakers from the very beginning” (Argomaniz, 2014, p. 11).  
 
“Positive” online measures  
Generally less contentious are “positive” online counter-terrorism measures that employ online 
engagement and outreach rather than content controls to stem the encouragement of violence. There 
are few hard laws in this area, but the UK’s Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015, section 26, does 
impose a legal duty to “have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into 
terrorism”. The extent to which this duty will require official online activity remains to be determined by 
ministerial guidance, though it might be predicted that most requirements will be negative rather than 
positive – such as requirements for educational establishments to warn students and even to filter out 
materials.  
Existing positive campaigns have tended to focus upon social media which target youth, since they are 
believed to be particularly vulnerable to violent online political extremist rhetoric. This work is often 
undertaken by non-governmental organizations and individual activists, including young people 
themselves; although some such campaigns have also been undertaken by state agencies.  
Within the realm of state interventions, shortly after 11 September 2001, the UK domestic Security 
Service (MI5) took the unprecedented step of posting an appeal for information about potential 
terrorists on dissident Arab websites (Conway, 2007b). The message, in Arabic, was placed on sites that 
the authorities knew were accessed by extremists, including Islah.org, a Saudi Arabian opposition site, 
and Qoqaz.com, a Chechen site that advocated jihad. MI5 were hopeful of eliciting information from 
persons on the margins of extremist groups or communities who were sufficiently shocked by the 
events of 11 September 2001 to want to contact the agency. The agency had intended to post the 
message on a further 15 sites known to be accessed by radicals, but many of these were shut down by 
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the FBI in the aftermath of the attacks. The security agencies continue not only to monitor traffic but 
also to intervene actively in extremist blogs and forums. The FBI has been especially aggressive in its use 
of enticement tactics, often beginning with internet-based contacts (Human Rights Watch and Columbia 
Law School, 2014; Laguardia, 2013; Sherman, 2008 –2009; Stevenson, 2008).  
More open and positive institutional interventions have also been revealed. In 2007, the UK Home 
Office established the Research Information and Communications Unit (RICU) as a cross-departmental 
strategic communications body based at its Office for Security and Counter-terrorism; RICU seeks to 
coordinate government communication activities to counter violent extremism while promoting inter-
community relations (see https://www.counterextremism.org/download_file/106/134/413/). The 
government has also proposed to establish in 2015 the 77th Brigade within the British Army, dubbed 
“Facebook warriors” by one newspaper:  
77th Brigade is being created to draw together a host of existing and developing capabilities essential to meet the 
challenges of modern conflict and warfare. It recognises that the actions of others in a modern battlefield can be 
affected in ways that are not necessarily violent. (MacAskill, 2015)  
The US Army also created a Cyber Command in 2009 (http://www.arcyber.army.mil/ history.html).  
Another “positive” government agency initiative is the US State Department’s Center for Strategic 
Counterterrorism Communications’ (CSCC) “Think Again Turn Away” social media campaign. The CSCC 
was established in 2010,  
to coordinate, orient, and inform government-wide foreign communications activities targeted against terrorism 
and violent extremism, particularly al-Qaeda, and its affiliates and adherents ... The Digital Outreach Team actively 
and openly engages in Arabic, Urdu, Punjabi, and Somali to counter terrorist propaganda and misinformation 
about the United States across a wide variety of interactive digital environments that had previously been ceded to 
extremists. (http://www.state.gov/r/cscc/)  
The CSCC is both praised and vilified for “Think Again Turn Away”, an English language social media 
campaign that commenced in 2013, whose mission is described on its Facebook page as “to expose the 
facts about terrorists and their propaganda”. In addition to its Facebook presence, the campaign is also 
active on Ask.fm, Googleþ, Tumblr, Twitter, and YouTube, where it disseminates content that addresses 
the same grievances as those in extremist content, including in some instances creating “mash-ups” of IS 
content and recirculating it. Some commentators have viewed the CSCC’s online activity as 
“embarrassing” and “ineffective” (Katz, 2014).  
In 2012, the EU established its Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) under Directorate General 
Home Affairs to dissuade people from participating in violent extremism and terrorism or to persuade 
them to separate themselves from such ideas and methods in the first place 
(http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/ 
radicalisation_awareness_network/index_en.htm). The RAN is composed of eight working groups, one 
of which, RAN@, is tasked with “develop[ing] frontline partnerships around the collation, creation, and 
dissemination of counter-[violent extremist] and alternative-narratives through the Internet and social 
media”. Other RAN working groups have also discussed using the internet to reach out to publics; RAN 
Voices of Victims of Terrorism, for example, seeks to have the voices of terrorism victims amplified via 
the internet and social media.  
Finally, private actors have challenged violent jihadism online. Some are heavily backed by government, 
such as the Quilliam Foundation (http://www.quilliamfoundation. org), but others have been initiated 
by individuals and non-governmental organizations. Their denunciations or alternative interpretations 
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have taken many different forms, ranging from online video and other online responses denouncing 
violent extremism by scholars and imams to wide-ranging multimedia campaigns such as “My Jihad” 
(http:// myjihad.org/), from ordinary individuals uploading videos to YouTube to more general macro-
level positive messaging about Islam targeted at children and youth such as Naif alMutawa’s comic and 
animated series, “The 99” (http://www.the99.org/). A particularly interesting example is Abdullah-X, a 
series of online animated shorts developed by a former extremist, which received support from RAN@ 
and Google (https://www.youtube. com/user/abdullahx). The developer’s status as a former extremist 
probably lends the project greater credibility than some of those described earlier, and the site may be 
more accessible and appealing to youth than most state-sponsored campaigns. The range of private 
action has extended into more negative attacks and forms of vigilantism. In this category are Internet 
Haganah (Weimann, 2006, p. 199) and Anonymous, which in 2015 launched “Op Charlie Hebdo” with 
the purpose of disabling jihadi forums and social media accounts. Such attack strategies have been 
criticized by those who argue that violent extremist online forums and other violent extremist 
cyberspaces can serve as valuable providers of open source intelligence for states’ intelligence agencies 
(Lasker, 2005; McCants, 2011; Torres Soriano, 2012; Zelin, 2013).  
 
Conclusion  
Given that the internet is part of the infrastructure of contemporary everyday life in the same way as 
supermarkets and motorways, it is misguided to place responsibility on the internet for the aberrant 
terrorist usage of a small minority or to require that CSPs should treat everyone as an equal risk and 
potential suspect. In response to criticisms of failures by MI5 in averting the murder of Lee Rigby in 
Woolwich by Adebolajo and Adebowale, the government expressed itself “confident that MI5 prioritises 
available resources and deploys them proportionately to the level of risk represented and as necessary 
to satisfactorily mitigate the risk, based on the information known at the time” (Cabinet Office, 2015, p. 
7). Yet it seems, by contrast, that CSPs are expected to perform to a higher duty of care with no margin 
for error or discretion: “Communications Services Providers (CSPs) have a responsibility to ensure their 
networks are not used to plot terrorist attacks” (p. 5). A more realistic understanding is that even with 
extensive criminal offences, intrusion into free speech activities, and the running of new bureaucracies 
and programmes of funding, one can feel assured that not all terrorism will be averted and that it is 
unrealistic to expect the CSPs to act as better all-seeing and all-doing state agents than the security 
agencies themselves. More generally, the acculturalization of immigrant communities in Western values 
and lifestyles will prove very difficult owing to the perceived shallowness of those lifestyles and the 
hypocrisy in the official adherence to proclaimed values. It is also difficult to compete in the marketplace 
of ideas against the narratives of jihadism which speak in simplistic, hedonistic, and graphic language 
not available to official spokespersons. As a result, the dismal prospect is that, no matter how much the 
state strives to counter international terrorism or demands that the internet becomes perfectly self-
policing, current emanations of violent extremism will take generations to assuage.  
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